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Abstract: This paper presents a measurement study and analysis of the structure of multiple Islamic terrorist networks 
to determine if similar characteristics exist between those networks. We examine data gathered from four 
terrorist groups: Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) consisting of six terror 
networks. Our study contains 471 terrorists’ nodes and 2078 links.  Each terror network is compared in terms 
efficiency, communication and composition of network metrics.  The paper examines the effects these terrorist 
attacks had on US aerospace and defence stocks (herein War stocks). We found that the Islamic terror groups 
increase recruitment during the planned attacks, communication increases during and after the attacks between 
the subordinate terrorists and low density is a common feature of Islamic terrorist groups. The Al-
Qaeda organisation structure was the most complex and superior in terms of secrecy, diameter, clustering, 
modularity and density. Jemaah Islamiyah followed a similar structure but not as superior.  The ISIS and LeT 
organisational structures were more concerned with the efficiency of the operation rather than secrecy. We 
found that war stocks prices and the S+P 500 were lower the day after the attacks, however, the war stocks 
slightly outperformed the S+P 500 the day after the attacks. Further, we found that war stock prices were 
significantly lower one month after the terrorist attacks but the S+P 500 rebounded one month later.
1 INTRODUCTION 
The tragic and catastrophic events of 9/11 and the 
Paris terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2015 have 
propelled the intelligence communities’ use of social 
network analysis. Terror networks are designed in 
their structure to maximise secrecy, efficiency, 
resilience and remain as clandestine communities 
(Krebs, 2002) Social network analysis allows us to 
visualise the network structures and determine 
insights from these networks. This knowledge 
discovery or intelligence from terrorist networks is of 
vital importance for combatting the war on terrorism. 
In recent years, there has a been a surge in 
geopolitically motivated terrorist attacks. A common 
factor to all terrorist networks is the need or wish to 
remain secret; although what is to be kept secret and 
from whom differs, and indeed is rarely specified 
(Crossley et al, 2010) A terrorist network may form 
from the consequence of pre-existing ties, i.e. kinship 
or friendship, and of people’s political motivations 
that incite individuals or a collective group to act 
cooperatively regardless of previous relations. 
(Crossley et al, 2010; Krebs, 2002; Everton, 2011) 
provide terrorist network theory on co-participation 
in events and co-membership in groups to explain 
network tendencies i.e. hierarchical/non-hierarchical 
structure, vulnerability, efficiency, and 
decentralisation over time. Whilst (Baker and 
Faulkner, 1993; Natarajan, 2000; Koschade, 2006; 
Morselli, 2007; Demiroz and Kapucu, 2012; Enders 
and Su, 2007) examine communication, and analyse 
structure and formation to focus on security and 
efficiency trade-off, core-periphery structure, 
centralisation/decentralisation, and resilience. An in-
depth understanding of the graph structure of terrorist 
networks is necessary to evaluate the networks to 
understand the hierarchical structure of the networks. 
The importance of efficiency and secrecy in terrorist 
networks clearly emerges when terrorists need to 
carry out an attack. This is when the group members 
emerge from the shadows in the aftermath and we can 
then see which element is more important to the 
terrorist groups in terms of the planned and executed 
attack. In this paper, we present 471 terrorists and 
2078 links belonging to four terrorist groups and six 
terror networks. Data gathered from multiple sources 
enables us to identify common structural properties of 
  
these terror networks. The paper is organised as 
follows firstly we describe the terror groups and the 
attacks. Section 2 we use graph theory to graph all of 
the terror network data, relationships and data 
processing. Section 3, we analyse the S+P500 
volatility, war stock and S+P 500 market 
performance. We analyse the terror networks in 
addition to comparing the network metrics for each 
terror network attack in terms of efficiency, 
communication and compositional network metrics. 
Section 4 evaluates the results; section 5 contains 
related literature and finally, in section 6, we 
conclude with discussing our findings. 
1.1 Terrorist Groups and Terrorist 
Attacks 
In this section, we give a brief description of the 
terrorist group and their related attacks that form part 
thereof this study 
1.1.1 Al-Qaeda 
Al-Qaeda is a global Islamic terrorist organisation 
founded by Palestinian terrorist operative Abdullah 
Azzam in 1988. Al-Qaeda originated in Afghanistan 
as an underground movement that operated against 
the Soviet occupation. Al-Qaeda has become a global 
Islamic terrorist organisation operating in many 
arenas around the world. Ideologically, Al-Qaeda 
relies on the Salafi school of Islam, viewing jihad as 
the personal duty of every Muslim. Al-Qaeda was 
behind a series of showcase attacks against the United 
States, the most prominent of which was the attack on 
the World Trade Center in New York on September 
11, 2001 (Terrorism-info, 2018) and the Madrid 
bombings 2004. The attacks resulted in over 3,000 
deaths and over 8000 casualties collectively 
1.1.2 ISIS 
ISIS is a powerful Islamic terrorist militant group that 
has seized control of large areas of the Middle East. 
The group is responsible for a series of European 
terror attacks in Paris and Brussels that claimed the 
lives of 162 people and 713 casualties. 
1.1.3 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is an Islamic militant 
organisation based in Pakistan with links to Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS. The group is responsible for the Mumbai 
attacks in 2008. The attacks commenced on 
November 26th and ended on November 29th after an 
intense operation lasting over sixty hours. The attacks 
were carried out by 10 militants armed with advanced 
weapons at five prime locations in Mumbai, India’s 
financial capital. Nearly 260 persons, from ten 
countries, were killed in the attack. 
1.1.4 Jemaah Islamiyah (Ji) 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a militant Islamist group 
active in several Southeast Asian countries that seeks 
to establish a pan-Islamic state across much of the 
region. JI is alleged to have attacked or plotted against 
U.S. and Western targets in Indonesia, Singapore, and 
the Philippines. Herein, we analyse the attacks on the 
Australian Embassy in 2004 which had 11 fatalities 
and 150 causalities in addition to examining the Bali 
attacks in 2005 which claimed the lives of 20 people 
and had 120 causalities.  
2 DATASET(S) 
2.1 Dataset 
The six terrorist networks datasets can be accessed 
within the public domain from the authors listed in 
figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Dataset sources. 
We have also included a non-terrorist network i.e. the 
Raytheon online financial community in order to 
understand if terrorist networks have distinct 
properties compared to a non-terrorist networks. 
2.2 Nodes 
Nodes on the terrorist networks are a representation 
from the following characteristics. 
  
(i) Attackers: Those involved in the planned terrorist 
attacks. This included operational leadership and 
operational personnel. Relations derived from 
interactions, including participation in political or 
military events, political meetings, training in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya, combats, negotiations for 
hostage releases, or involvements with a killing, an 
abduction, or a bombing.  
(ii) Those known to have been involved in organising 
terror attacks but may not have carried out an attack.  
(iii) Family members who were known to play a role 
or be associated with terror network, this included In-
laws, cousins, siblings, parent/child, spouse, 
grandparents and significant others.  
(iv) Users from the online financial community. We 
collected data about users’ activities on Yahoo! 
Finance Message Boards from 2001 until 2014 for the 
war stock “Raytheon”. Yahoo! Finance keeps a 
message board for each stock quoted on the US 
market. Each message board is a stream of threads 
opened by registered users. Each thread is a stream of 
messages posted by users. A user can decide to add a 
new message to a thread, answer to an existing 
message or open a new thread. We gathered the list of 
threads, the list of messages for each thread, the 
content of each message, time of the message, users 
and the citations between users (i.e. if a user replied 
to another user). There were approximately 3,754 
messages regarding the Raytheon stock examined, 
written in about 3,419 threads by about 533 users.  We 
then extracted data four months before the Syrian 
uprising in 2011 and the period after until December 
2011. 
2.3 Aerospace and Defence Industry 
The U.S. aerospace and defence industry is the 
world’s leading innovator and producer of 
technologically advanced aircraft, space and defence 
systems and supports one of the largest high-skill and 
high-wage workforces in the U.S.A. There is both a 
commercial side and military side to the industry. 
Some of the firms are involved in building 
commercial aircraft and from the military standpoint 
the U.S. government is the principal customer. The 
industry boasts of heavy investment in research and 
development with the U.S. government funding a 
high percentage of these costs. The U.S. government 
also exerts huge influence over the industry through a 
tender process for contract procurement to each of the 
aerospace and defence firms. These contracts are 
issued by the US Department of Defence and defined 
by military branch such as U.S. Marine corps, U.S. 
Navy, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. 
We used a set of seven aerospace and defence sector 
stocks known as “war stocks” to establish if there 
were any significance prices changes after the attacks 
within the US aerospace and defence sector. The war 
stocks listed in table 1 are medium and large 
capitalisation US manufacturing companies that 
manufacture military equipment. The column 
capitalisation is the market capitalisation of each 
stock in billions of dollars, while the figure in 
parentheses is the relative size of each stock over the 
capitalisation of all seven stocks for May 2018. The 
war stocks have a total capitalisation of $671.91B 
which represents about 2.6% of the capitalisation of 
the S+P 500 index. 
Table 1: War stocks considered in the study. 
Stock Ticker Capitalisation 
Honeywell HON $108.76B (16.18%) 
United Tech UTX $96.52B (14.36%) 
Lockheed Martin  LMT $92B $(13.69%) 
General Dynamics GD $60.09B (8.94%) 
Northrop Grumman  NOC $26.5B (8.66%) 
Raytheon Co. RTN $59.06B (8.79%) 
Boeing BA $197.2B (29.35%) 
2.4 Network Metrics 
To describe and illustrate each network the following 
metrics were used   
(i) Number of nodes N: The number of nodes 
represents the number of terrorists active in the period 
of observation. For the online financial network, the 
number of nodes represents the number of users 
active in the period of observation. 
(ii) Number of edges ۳: There is an edge from 
terrorist a to terrorist b if   terrorist a communicated 
with terrorist b. The number of edges is a measure of 
the interactions between terrorists. For the online 
financial network similarly, there is an edge from user 
a to user b if a replied to b (at least once). The number 
of edges is a measure of the interactions between 
users. 
(iii) Clustering Co-efficient CC:  To understand how 
the network behaves it is necessary to segregate the 
nodes into cliques.  A clique is simply a subgraph 
where all nodes are more loosely tied to one another 
than they are to nodes that are not part of the graph.  
It depicts closeness of the groups within the terrorist 
  
and online networks. Thus, the clustering coefficient 
of a graph ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values 
representing a higher degree of “cliquishness” 
between the nodes. In particular, a graph with 
clustering coefficient of 0 contains no “triangles” of 
connected nodes, whereas a graph with clustering 
coefficient of 1 is a perfect clique. (Watts and 
Strogatz, 1998) found that high clustering and short 
characteristic chain length are the distinctive 
properties of many small-world networks. 
(iv) Average Shortest path ASP: There is a constant 
dynamic between keeping the network hidden and 
actively using it to accomplish objectives (Baker and 
Faulkner, 1993). Contextually we use the average 
shortest path to indicate a level of secrecy and observe 
the information flow of the networks. It’s a measure 
of the average distance between each distant member 
of both the terrorist and online networks. The 
measurement shows the diffusion of information 
sharing on the networks. This is desirable for a 
network in terms of secrecy because in a clustering 
topology less individual members are exposed to 
information and communication (Ozgul and Erdem, 
2015) 
(v) The Modularity measurement defined herein as 
M, is the calculation of edges in the communities 
minus the expected number of edges in terror and 
online networks. That fact that modularity helps 
define if groups are working closely knit conveys 
useful information in regards to the group’s behaviour 
and communication flow both in terms of efficiency 
and secrecy. 
(vi) Density herein as Den (n).  Network density 
represents the number of ties in a network as a ratio 
of the total number of maximum ties that are possible 
with all the nodes in a network.  A fully connected 
terrorist and online network has value of 1, which 
indicates all nodes are connected to each other. A 
network with a density of near 0 indicates that the 
terror and online networks are sparsely knit. Density 
is a measure of the networks cohesiveness.  
(vii)  Diameter herein as D( n), represents how far 
nodes are away from each in the network 
(viii) E, Efficiency (harmonicclosnesscentrality) 
refers to the networks ability to carry out terrorist 
operations as computed from the mean to mean 
person distances. The metric is used here to calculate 
if one terrorist was removed from their network could 
the network still carry out its tasks? Using (0,1) with 
1 being the highest. 
(ix) AD, Average Degree is used herein to calculate 
the average links per node on each of the networks 
2.5 Representation of Terror Networks 
and Online Financial Community 
The notation for the terrorist networks is  ℵ௧ି  and ℵ௧ା. 
ℵ௧ି  represents the network of terrorists before the 
terrorist attack ݐ , while ℵ௧ା the network of terrorist 
after the event. The notation for the online financial 
community network is the following. We call ℵ௘ି ௗ(ݔ) 
and ℵ௘ାௗ(ݔ) the networks of online users for the stock 
ݔ built considering all the messages about stock ݔ 
posted at day ݐ௘೔ ± ݀ where ݐ௘೔ is the timestamp of 
event ݁௜ and ݀ is the number of days. ℵ௘ି ௗ(ݔ)  
represents the network of investors before the 
geopolitical, military or terrorist event  ݁௜, while 
ℵ௘ାௗ(ݔ) the network after the event. The geopolitical 
event here is the commencement of the Syrian 
uprising in March 2011. The stock is Raytheon. To 
build out the networks we used Gephi. It is a modular 
and extensible open-source network visualisation 
platform. It focuses on visualisation and 
manipulation, simplicity and extensibility (Bastian et 
al, 2009). Gephi is commonly known as graph 
database software. We converted the terrorist public 
domain datasets in the Gephi format and uploaded 
same into the database and ran the graph simulation 
function to create the network. We then performed the 
social network analysis using the Gephi functions.  
For the “Raytheon” stock online financial community 
we used a python parser to web scape the messages 
from Yahoo finance. We formatted the findings and 
used Gephi to create the network and perform social 
network analysis. 
2.6  War Stock Price Methodology 
To compute the war stock price returns we need to 
identify a methodology to classify the daily returns, 
so given a stock ݔ	and a terrorist event ݐ௜ ∈ ℰ, we use 
the following notation: ௧ܲ೔(ݔ) is the price of stock ݔ 
on the day  ݐ௜, while ௧ܲ೔±௧(ݔ) is the closing price of 
stock ݔ  on t+1 . The return of each stock (also called 
the gain of a stock) is denoted by G. For instance,  
ܩ௧೔±ௗ(ݔ) is the gain of the stock ݔ after  ݀ + 1 days 
from the previous day for event ݁௜. By definition it is: 
 
 ܩ௧೔ାௗ(ݔ) =
௉೟೔
శ೏(௫)ି௉೟೔(௫)
௉೟೔(௫)
	 , 						ܩ௧೔ିௗ(ݔ) =
௉೟೔(௫)ି௉೟೔
ష೏(௫)
௉೟೔
ష೟(௫)  
 
 
 
  
3 ANALYSES 
3.1 SNA Metrics Analysis 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the SNA metrics per terrorist 
group per attack one year before and the day after the 
attacks respectively inclusive of the Raytheon online 
Yahoo! financial community. The before and after 
dates taken for the Raytheon network represents the 
four months period before the Syrian uprising of 
March 2011 and the after period right up until 
December 2011. We use the Raytheon online 
financial network for comparability only.  The before 
and after networks show the following metrics about 
the terrorist groups and attacks. 
 
Figure 2: One year before terror attacks. 
 
Figure 3: Network after the terror attacks. 
(i) Diameter:  Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah ensure 
that the ability to get from one side of the network to 
the other with information or just in terms of 
communication before the attacks is difficult. This is 
evident during the 911 and Australian embassy 
campaigns. In the after networks Al-Qaeda and ISIS 
maintained large diameter infrastructures, 
theoretically to avoid penetration. This is important 
because it tells us how quickly information will 
spread through the network and also how integrated 
different components within the network are likely to 
be. Making a connection within a network or 
traveling from one node to another incurs a cost. 
Regarding terrorist groups that cost is usually the risk 
of identification of its members. It typically costs 
some resource, whether this is the risk of losing a 
member, to the identification of a core or subordinate 
member of the network. The further a terrorist has to 
travel along a network to get from node  a to node b 
the more it will cost and the less likely it will occur, 
with the result being a lower level of integration from 
the group leaders and a layer of secrecy. In 
comparison to the terrorist networks the online 
financial network exhibits the smallest diameter thus 
confirming a network that is not of a clandestine 
nature. 
(ii) Average Degree: Al-Qaeda and JI are the most 
connected networks before and after the attacks. The 
average number of links per nodes were highest in the 
Bali, Madrid and the Australian embassy attacks. We 
can use the average degree as a measurement of 
cooperative behaviour amongst the terrorists. On 
average each terrorist had on average between 6 and 
8 connections. The Raytheon network is not a highly 
connected network as nodes have average degree of 
1, demonstrating the contrary, a low level of 
connectivity in the network.  
(iii) Clustering: In general, a clustering method 
attempts to reorganise some entities into relatively 
homogeneous groups. These groups have a purpose 
moreover based around function. According to (Raab 
and Milward, 2003) these microstructures are 
prevalent amongst terrorist groups. On the contrary 
(Helfstein and Wright, 2011) argued that clustering 
does not exist in terrorist networks as it minimises 
secrecy. Our study shows that Al-Qaeda and JI 
demonstrate a higher-level degree of “cliquishness” 
for the Bali, Madrid and Australian embassy attacks. 
In an overall context all of the Islamic terrorist groups 
displayed a high level of “cliquishness” amongst their 
organisation structure. 
(iv) Efficiency: For the ease of communication or 
resilience of the network or indeed the capacity of the 
network to function in the face of adversity or 
disruption (Krebs, 2002). As we know none of the 
networks were incapacitated, all attacks were carried 
out with devastating consequences. Therefore, if 
intelligence communities did capture some of the 
suspects before the attacks, we now know none of the 
networks were encumbered. If the network structure 
is defined by the network aim (Morselli,2007) 
conventional wisdom would suggest that a terrorist 
network would aim to reduce any risk associated with 
revealing its members and its core aim.  Looking at 
  
efficiency and its inverse value secrecy we see that 
LeT and ISIS were prepared to risk members of the 
groups in terms of efficiency during the Mumbai and 
Paris attacks. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda valued 
secrecy more than efficiency in terms of their 
organisational structure.   
(v) Modularity: The ability to detect community 
structures in terrorist groups is of significant practical 
importance. It provides a mechanism to identify what 
functions of the sub sections of the terrorist groups 
are actually performing.  Alternatively, modularity 
may expose the fact that no communities exist at all. 
(Krebs 2002) highlighted the importance of 
modularity in addition to the importance of secrecy. 
This was a feature of the Al-Qaeda 911 organisational 
structure where Osama Bin Laden ensured that no 
single module within the 911 network knew another 
module. Considering the networks are preferential 
connected networks our analyses shows that a high 
level of modularity exists within these groups. LeT, 
ISIS and Al-Qaeda display high modularity in the 
before and after attacks. Interestingly, the Raytheon 
network shares the same characteristic as the terrorist 
networks where you have a high level of communities 
working separately where nodes are connected "more 
densely" to each other than to the nodes in other 
communities.  
(vi) Density: Refers to the portion of a network that 
are connected. In theory, according to (Krebs 2002, 
Natarajan 2000, Raab, and Milward 2003) terrorist 
networks are sparse and show low density. In 
evaluating the hypothesis that these networks need to 
remain clandestine, we can conclude that our findings 
reveal that the low density does exist. ISIS and Al-
Qaeda show lower density in the before and after 
attacks suggesting a higher degree of intelligence in 
terms tradecraft and education (Helfstein and Wright, 
2011). This bears true in the fact that the ISIS and Al-
Qaeda operatives were trained by the CIA. 
(vii) Average Shortest Path: The shortest path 
between two nodes with the minimum number of 
edges. It can be seen as a measurement of the 
efficiency of information on the network. Where vital 
intelligence needs to be distributed across the 
network, clearly it will reach nodes quicker if there 
are only 4 steps from any other node than if it is a 
hundred steps from any node. ISIS and LeT are 
prominent in efficient flows of intelligence on their 
before networks whilst the Al-Qaeda structure before 
and after the attacks are more concerned with making 
it difficult to penetrate their networks relying a more 
veiled approach. In terms of comparability we can see 
that Raytheon’s network consists of the shortest 
average path, which would make sense in terms of 
reciprocal communication within the online 
community. 
3.1.1 Average Nodes Before and After 
We performed a collective averaged terrorist attack 
analysis of the SNA metrics using the averages of 
nodes, edges diameter, average degree, clustering, 
efficiency, modularity and the average shortest path. 
Table 2 illustrates each SNA metric and time interval, 
the value of the before and after network along with 
the augmentation (in percentage) if any and the output 
of the statistical test for the terrorist networks only. 
We computed a Wilcoxon signed rank test to 
calculate the results. The after-network edges indicate 
there was increased communication between the 
terrorists during and after the attacks. ++ indicates the 
values of the after network are greater than the values 
of the network at .95% confidence level. + indicates 
a 90% confidence level. Where WT = then no 
significant difference in after network. The absolute 
value of each indicator is important in order to 
understand not only if the difference is significant for 
the averaged terrorist attack, but also if the absolute 
value of the indicator suggests a significant statistical 
difference in these attacks. 
Table 2: SNA indicators for before and after networks. 
Metric After Bf %  
Diff 
Z  WT 
ௗܰ(ܰ) 43.5 35 .242 .172 = 
ࡱࢊ(ࡺ) 225.8 120.5 .874 .046 ++ 
Dia(N) 5.16 6.33 -0.184 .109 = 
Aver (D) 5.35 3.40 0.573 .028 ++ 
ऍ࢒࢛࢙࢚ࢋ࢘(ࡺ) 0.49 0.37 0.324 .046 ++ 
ܧ݂݂݅ܿ(ܰ) 0.57 .50 0.139 .116 = 
ܯ݋݀(ܰ) 0.44 .50 -0.12 .463 = 
ܣܵܲ(ܰ) 2.26 2.66 -.150 .116 = 
ࣞ݁݊(ܰ) 0.17 .12 .416 .173 = 
There are notably three statistical differences such 
that the edges, average degree metric and the 
clustering coefficient increased in the after networks. 
This alludes to the fact that communication increased 
during and after the attacks which is reflective of the 
increase of edges in the after networks. The average 
degree per terrorist also increased indicating 
increased communication amongst the terrorist 
  
groups during and after the attacks. The clustering 
coefficient refers to the cliquishness of nodes within 
the networks suggests that terrorists who undertook 
the attacks actually knew each other and worked in 
homogeneous groups during and after the attacks. 
3.1.2 Terrorist Leadership Analysis 
We analysed the role of leadership within the various 
terror attacks by computing the average in degree 
communication for directed networks for each of the 
attacks before and after and aimed to understand how 
communication was managed. In-Degree centrality of 
observed nodes is the number of direct links to other 
nodes. A superior value of in-degree centrality often 
considers the node as the most prominent individual 
in the network. Nodes were determined as leaders in 
the first three instances for each attack with the 
highest in-degree centrality. The WT statistical test 
results show that communication from the terrorist 
group leaders didn’t change before and during the 
attacks however communication increased 
significantly during the attacks from the other 
members of the terrorist groups. 
Table 3: The average In -Degree of terrorist group leader 
and their subordinates before and during the attacks. 
 After Before %Diff Z  WT 
Terrorist 
leader 
14.99 10.72 .398 .104 = 
 After Before Diff Z  WT 
Terrorists 4.11 2.81 .462 .046 ++ 
3.1.3 Strong and Weak Communities 
Structures 
Strong communities have more links within their own 
community than with the rest of the network.  Such 
that ݇௧೔୧୬୲(ܥ) ൐ 	݇௧೔ୣ୶୲(ܥ)  where ݇௧೔୧୬୲ of the node i is 
the number of links that connect i to the rest of the 
network. c is the cluster.  The external degree ݇௧೔ୣ୶୲ is 
number of links that connect i to the rest of the 
network. To detect weak and strong communities per 
group, we examined the modularity at a more 
granular level. We computed using an overall 
percentile ranking approach inclusive of all terrorist 
groups to detect the weak community modules within 
each network. We then computed an analysis of 
variance per group to test if there were any statistical 
differences. We found that LeT group has the weakest 
communities within their organisational structure 
where 5 of their 6 communities were ranked under a 
30% percentile.  Whilst Al-Qaeda had the strongest 
communities such that the lowest ranked community 
ranked at the 50% percentile rate for the 911 attacks 
whilst one community ranked at a 10% percentile for 
the Madrid attack. 
Table 4: LeT Analysis of variance for weak community 
structures. 
Group Groups Mean 
 Diff 
࣌ࢊ࢏ࢌࢌ
√࢔   
P-val Sig 
LeT JI -.35% .136 .068 + 
 ISIS -.40% .136 .031 ++ 
 Al-Q -.54% .124 .001 ++ 
3.2 VIX and Abnormal Returns 
Historical prices for the war stocks and the S+P500 
adjusted for splits and dividends were collected from 
Yahoo! Finance. To understand if the terror attacks 
were associated in periods of high volatility and 
abnormal returns, we measured the market variance 
using the VIX index calculated with a 50-day moving 
average. This is a market indicator for the 
measurement of uncertainly. 
 
Figure 4: Before VIX SP500 Index with adjusted close and 
Net % Change. 
Figure 4 shows the implied volatility the day before 
the terror attacks, a 90-percentile level, a 10-
percentile level, the average and the median 
computed over the periods of observation. The 
computation indicates that only two of the events 
were in a period of high volatility (above 80 
percentile level), that being the Paris and Madrid 
attacks. The Australian and Bali attacks were 
positioned within average volatility whilst the 911 
and Mumbai attacks happened in lower level 
percentile of 20%.  We can conclude that these 
terrorist attacks happened in periods of mixed 
volatility. Abnormal S+P500 returns were also 
characterised in a mixed return period with Paris and 
Madrid attacks aligned to the 80-percentile level, Bali 
  
and the Australian embassy attacks showing average 
S+P500 returns for the period and 911 and Mumbai 
presenting below the 20-percentile level.  A T-Paired 
test concluded that there was no significant difference 
between the before and after VIX model. The after 
VIX is shown in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: VIX SP500 Index with adjusted close and Net % 
Change. 
To conclude, we can state that apart from the Paris 
and Madrid attacks which both showed high volatility 
and higher abnormal returns, the terrorist events can 
be categorised as normal. 
3.2.1 War Stocks and S+P500 Price 
Reaction to Attacks 
We tested using a T-paired test to establish if the price 
of the war stocks differs significantly after the 
terrorist events from the price before the said terrorist 
attacks.  We did likewise with the S+P 500 prices in 
addition to comparing the prices of the war stocks to 
the S+P 500 price changes. We wanted to understand 
if the war stocks behave the same way as the market 
after terrorist attacks.  To compare price changes of 
the war stocks against the S+P 500, we computed an 
aggerated price index for the war stocks in the same 
way the S+P 500 is calculated. The results from Table 
5 show that whilst the aerospace and defence stock 
prices and the S+P 500 are lower after the attacks, 
there is no significant statistical difference. However, 
the aerospace and defence stocks outperformed the 
S+ P500 one day after the terrorist attacks with a 
confidence level of 0.95 and t value of -5.41.  We 
measured the aerospace and defence stock price 
difference one month before and after the terrorist 
attacks and found that prices were statistically 
significantly lower after the terrorist attack with a 
confidence level of 0.95 and t value of 2.62, however, 
the market did recover significantly after a month 
with a confidence level of 0.95 and t value of 3.8. 
Table 5: Comparisons between war stocks, S+P 500 and 
war stocks V S+P 500 before and after terrorist attacks. 
Indicators Mean 
Diff 
࣌ࢊ࢏ࢌࢌ
√࢔   
t-
value 
Sig 
ܩ௪௦ିଵݒݏ. ܩ௪௦ାଵ .07% 2.81 .177 = 
ܩ௦௣ିଵݒݏ. ܩ௦௣ାଵ 4.41% 50.24 .215 = 
ܩ௪௦ାଵݒݏ. ܩ௦௣ାଵ -.19% 878 -5.41 ++ 
ܩ௪௦ିଷଵݒݏ. ܩ௪௦ାଷଵ 1.40% 3.48 2.62 ++ 
ܩ௦௣ିଷଵݒݏ. ܩ௦௣ାଷଵ 22.89 14.7 3.8 ++ 
4 RESULTS 
We find that Islamic terrorist groups and terrorist 
attacks share similar characteristics. Little similarity 
exists between the terrorist networks and the online 
financial community network. 
(i) We can see that the Islamic terrorist groups 
increase recruitment over a period a year period 
leading into the attacks. This is evidenced by the 
increase in the number of nodes joining the terrorist 
networks.  
(ii) Communication increases within the terrorist 
groups with notable higher interaction during and 
after the attacks again evidenced with the increases in 
edges on the networks.  Furthermore, the average 
communication between each terrorist increases 
during and after the attacks as noted with the 
increases in the average degree. 
(iii) Terrorist group leader’s communication 
frequency didn’t change before and during the attacks 
however communication increased significantly 
during the attacks from other members of the terrorist 
groups.  
(iv) A high level of “cliquishness” exists within the 
networks indicating that each clique or sub group 
performs a particular role or function supporting the 
attack. 
(v)  Low density is a common feature of the Islamic 
terrorist groups and is a mechanism deployed to 
protect identity and objectives. 
From an individual terrorist group perspective, we 
found the following: 
(vi) The Al-Qaeda organisational structures 
demonstrate superior formation in terms of diameter, 
clustering, modularity and density. The principle aim 
of the group is to protect its members and retain a veil 
of secrecy from inception of the attack to the 
completion of the mission. The Al-Qaeda 
  
organisation structure consists of large diameters to 
avoid penetration, low efficiency making it harder to 
contact various group members. Low density 
ensuring that only certain cliques on the networks are 
connected and others are not. A high average shortest 
path metric essentially confirms that trading 
efficiency for secrecy is of vital importance to the 
group.  Much of these structures would correlate to 
clandestine organisational structures deployed by the 
CIA when training Mujahideen operatives during the 
Soviet Afghan war in the late 70’s early 80’s. Jemaah 
Islamiyah share similar characteristics but not as 
superior. Al-Qaeda also inherit stronger community 
structures within their organisation. 
(vii) Remarkably, the ISIS organisation structure 
tends to trade secrecy for efficiency as deliberated by 
the social network metrics. Whilst an effort is made 
to reduce density in their network, it is boosted by a 
high metric for efficiency and low average shortest 
path metric. Similarly LeT also appear to more 
concerned with efficiency rather than allowing 
members to be captured or identified. 
The aerospace and defence sector analysis in this 
study found that: 
(viii) War stocks and the S+P 500 are lower the day 
after terrorist’s attacks in this study, however the war 
stocks outperformed the S+ P500 one day after for the 
aforementioned attacks. Findings indicated that war 
stocks were significantly lower one month after the 
attacks but the S+P 500 rebounded one month after 
the attacks. 
5 RELATED WORKS 
Krebs uncloaked terrorists in his paper (Krebs 2002). 
He demonstrated the superiority of social network 
analysis in identifying terrorists. His paper focused on 
newspaper articles in the media about the 911 
terrorists. He highlighted the fact that terrorist 
networks are structured to protect their members and 
protect objectives and secrecy. (Raab and Milward, 
2003) and (Helfstein and Wright, 2011) support and 
concur with Krebs hypothesis. Whilst this is evident 
in our analysis for Al-Qaeda, it is not evident for other 
groups such as LeT and ISIS. (Morselli, 2007) argued 
that various exogenous and endogenous factors may 
come into play. (Baker and Faulkner, 1993) stated 
that terrorist networks can be structured in simple or 
complex fashion based on information requirements 
depending on your rank or requirement for receiving 
data regarding the group or attack activity. 
Interestingly, (Choudhary et al, 2016) used an 
analytical hierarchical model combined with 
centrality measurement to rank key players, identify 
centrality and rank terrorists. To this end some find 
that terrorist networks are decentralised (Helfstein 
and Wright, 2011) or centralised (Baker and 
Faulkner, 1993).  (Morselli, 2007) in his paper looks 
at the network characteristics in terms of efficiency 
whilst (Krebs 2002) and (Raab and Milward, 2003) 
state efficiency as the resilience of the network. 
Conventional wisdom would suggest that any 
network that has not been disrupted and has the ability 
to carry out its functions and successfully complete 
the attack would be both efficient and resilient. 
However, that does not appear to be the case, 
considering one group may trade efficiency for 
secrecy whilst still carrying out a successful attack. 
(Krebs, 2002) stated that successful networks work 
off decentralised structures with a central node 
structure as characterised by his identification of 
central node and mastermind Mohammad Atta in his 
paper.  Networks can or cannot contain internal 
working communities. (Gill and Freeman,2013) 
identified that clustering exists within terrorist 
networks and is a prominent feature, on the contrary, 
(Helfstein and Wright, 2011) found that terrorist 
networks in some cases do not display a high level of 
clustering. Interestingly, our study shows the 
clustering coefficient is evident for all groups in our 
study. Density is closely associated with secrecy 
(Morselli 2007, Helfstein and Wright, 2011) and 
again this is a noticeable feature in our study and 
concurs with the said authors. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This study analysed multiple Islamic terror networks 
in terms of their efficiency, communication and 
composition of network metrics. The study found that 
Islamic terrorist groups deploy similar characteristics. 
Our study showed Islamic terrorist groups increase 
recruitment during the planned attacks, communica-
tion increases during and after the attacks between 
subordinate terrorists, and low density is a common 
feature of Islamic terrorist groups. The Al-Qaeda 
organisation structure was the most complex and 
superior in terms of secrecy, diameter, clustering, 
strong community modularity and density followed 
by Jemaah Islamiyah. The ISIS and LeT 
organisational structures were concerned with 
efficiency rather than secrecy and therefore, were 
more prone to penetration from the intelligenza 
communities. War stocks decreased after terrorist 
events and outperformed the S+P 500 the day after 
  
the attacks but were lower one month after the attacks 
whilst the market rebounded one month later.  
Future studies will include analysis of terrorist 
networks with prediction models using Twitter-based 
communities during terrorist attacks and their effects 
on the aerospace and defence sector. 
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